

Coastal Regions of Ukraine: Governance Transformation amid the Russian Invasion

Serhii Kuznietsov*, **Viktoriia Vladyshevskia****, **Serhii Kuznetsov*****

*PhD in Political Sciences, Center for Maritime Transport Specialists Training (42, Kanatna St., Odessa, Ukraine)
<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8607-6414>

**PhD in Law, Visiting Scholar, Faculty of Law and Administration, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University (5, pl. Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, Lublin, Poland)
<https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9666-5995>

***PhD in Law, Associate Professor, NGO "Association of Ukrainian Seamen" (2, Academichna St., Odessa, Ukraine)
<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7353-8982>

ABSTRACT


The current situation in Ukrainian coastal regions highlights the need for interaction between different types of transport to secure import and export demands. This is especially topical due to the risks presented by the Russo-Ukrainian armed conflict and the prospects of the future reconstruction of Ukraine. The current policy documents of long-term planning in the maritime sphere require a greater focus on the interests and needs of coastal regions. There should be specific norms for the synergy of the sea and inland water transport and different types of land transport within maritime regions. Building a comprehensive approach to foster the development of coastal regions necessitates the harmonization of varying program documents. The experience of marine and inland water transport during wartime, the shift of shipping from seaports to ports combining sea and river directions which occurred over five months during 2022, and the renewal of regional transport cooperation indicate the formation of a new integrated approach to coastal regions; one which demands updated regulation and long-term strategic planning.

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Introduction

Seaports and their equipment, coastal strips, and objects of critical infrastructure on coastal regions are extremely sensitive to both natural and artificial threats. For many coastal areas of the Black Sea region, 2022–2023 has become a challenging period. The large-scale earthquake that occurred on February 6, 2023 (Mogul et al., 2023), striking Turkey and neighboring Syria, will impact the maritime policy and marine and port activities of Turkey and neighboring countries. This is unsurprising given that the day after the earthquake, it was reported that the territory of Turkey had shifted by 3 meters (President of the National Institute of Geophysics in Italy, 2023). Turkey's maritime authority explained on February 6 that the port, located on the Mediterranean coast in the southern province of Hatay, was damaged due to the earthquake (Paone, 2023). At the same time, on the opposite shore of the Black Sea, the coastal regions of Ukraine are experiencing the consequences of the ninth year of Russian aggression. The entire seacoast of Ukraine Odesa—Mykolaiv, Kherson, Zaporizhzhya, Donetsk oblasts, Crimea – has suffered from Russian aggression either in the form of direct occupation or due to naval blockade (Malyarenko & Kormych, 2023; Fink, 2022). Following the full-scale Russian invasion, the maritime industry of these regions is in a critical state. Even international efforts, such as the Black Sea Grain Initiative 2022, have not led to adequate guarantees for the safety of maritime infrastructure, which is critical to ensure the recovery and sustainable development

of the coastal regions of Ukraine. The cruise missile attack on the Odesa seaport the day after the signing of the Black Sea Grain Initiative (Francis et al., 2022) indicated that international arrangements do not prevent Russia from the projection of force or the application of its hybrid playbook (Kormych & Malyarenko, 2022) against the Ukrainian maritime industry.

Nevertheless, at the end of 2022, Ukrainian authorities began the large-scale privatization of the port infrastructure. An auction was announced in December 2022 (Tarasovskyi, 2022) and the port of Ust-Dunaisk was sold in January 2023 (Kozlova, 2023). In February 2023, the appointment of the auction for the sale of the port of Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi (Ukraine will put the port "Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi" up for sale, 2023) was announced. After the beginning of the large-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, the ports of the Danube cluster took over a significant part of Ukraine's sea transportation and improved the performance of cargo trans-shipment. However, with the need for substantial investments and the crisis state of the economy, the Ukrainian government quickly ran out of options. Instead, it was forced to resort to the sale of assets (In Odesa region the state sold a port that brings in profit, 2023). This can be compared to the previous situation, when the government preferred concession agreements, which left opportunities for more active state participation in the "life" of ports. This signaled significant changes in governance approaches to the coastal regions and its port infrastructure, specifically favoring the broad involvement of the private sector.

Ukrainian Maritime Doctrine recognizes that the priorities of national interests include ensuring security through the balanced development of coastal regions. However, it is essential to build firm connections between maritime governance and different aspects of coastal region administration. Currently, coastal governance is an emergent challenge that requires evolution to overcome a frequently overstretched and fragmented governance system faced by significant societal challenges (Gonçalves & Pinho, 2022). The biggest challenge here emerges from the intersection of land-based and marine-based activities, each with their own legislative and governance instruments. Consequently, the "coast" becomes a "white line" that may be treated as either falling inside or outside existing governance regimes depending on circumstances and interests (O'Hagan et al., 2020). Furthermore, a coastline may represent not only a connection but also a dividing line, across which controversial land and maritime policies and interests collide. For example, in many cases, maritime policies and planning take priority over terrestrial planning in coastal areas (Howells & Ramirez-Monsalve, 2022), which may create obstacles for the substantial development of coastal regions. This issue may be addressed by adopting a more "joined up" or "coast-focused" approach to planning; however, this is dependent on improved community and stakeholder engagement (Yet et al., 2022). Modern literature emphasizes six main elements of governance effectiveness in addressing land-sea interactions: science-policy integration, leadership, networks, social fit, functional fit, and temporal fit (Pittman & Armitage, 2016). Therefore, it is vital to identify practical solutions and form "road maps" which support coastal regions, considering their role in the social and economic life of the State and its environmental and security protection.

Methodology

This article is based on the analysis of Ukrainian policy documents related to the development of coastal regions and empirical data on the maritime industry amid the Russo-Ukrainian armed conflict. Policy documents' provisions are analyzed against the implementation of modern concepts and best practices in coastal governance. The paper utilizes concepts of multi-level coastal governance, integrated coastal management, maritime spatial planning, and maritime regionalism. Relevant EU standards and practices are also considered.

1. Coastal Regions as Development Leaders

The Ukrainian Maritime Doctrine for the period up to 2035 pays special attention to the role of coastal regions in developing maritime activities and maritime industry. The section "Purpose, principles and directions of implementation of the state maritime policy" focuses on the sustainable development of coastal regions and the need to consider their socioeconomic development, as well as how to utilize their tourist and recreational potential. The section "Revival of shipbuilding" emphasizes the role of shipbuilding in the industrial development of coastal regions. Ecological concerns are represented by the need to ensure a decrease in the level of sea pollution (see the section "Development of scientific and technical potential").

At the same time, current Ukrainian legislation still lacks a definition of coastal regions. The most successful term is used in Draft Law regarding a coastal strip of seas, defining the latter as a zone of contact of land with the sea, including natural complexes of both the coast and the adjacent seawater area within the limits that allow for the ecologically balanced development of coastal area territories, the protection of coastal and marine landscapes and ecosystems from pollution and destruction, and a territory with a regime of limited and regulated economic and other activities. Meanwhile, Strachkova (2013) notes that coastal regions should be considered primarily in a practical sense – as a spatial system associated with specific territorial types of activities in combination with intensive, transregional economic and socio-humanitarian ties and cross-border communication (p. 87). Bezkhlibna (2021, p. 47) concludes that coastal regions should be considered administrative-territorial units that geographically have access to the seacoast with its water area; specialize in coastal types of economic and ecosystem activities with appropriate infrastructure; and have specific social and ecological problems and a cultural and historical heritage, which reflect the marine theme.

Sufficiently close to the notion of a "coastal region" is the definition of coastal zones provided by the European Commission report "Policy Alternatives Impacts on European Coastal Zones 2000 – 2050": a strip of land and sea of varying width depending on the nature of the environment and governance needs. This rarely corresponds to existing administrative or planning units. The natural coastal systems and areas in which human activities involve the use of coastal resources may therefore extend well beyond the limit of territorial waters and many kilometers inland (p. 15). In addition, coastal regions are more frequently involved in global and regional supply chains than inland regions. Due to usually favorable weather conditions, they are also significant producers of agricultural products, which can be exported with little expense via the river and sea routes. Thus, coastal regions constitute the most diverse manifestations of human activity and are usually "leader regions." Therefore, they require greater attention from the state, expansions of initiatives, and independence in making innovative organizational development decisions. Furthermore, the primary goal of their complex (integrated) governance is to determine the most optimal vector of sustainable development, based on which it is possible to organize economic activity as efficiently as possible. This will ensure the preservation, protection, and restoration of natural resource potential (Pavlenko, 2015, p. 100).

Despite the challenges of the Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict, the coastal regions have maintained leadership positions in ensuring the continuation of Ukraine's foreign trade. This is evidenced by the indicators of cargo handling in the seaports of Ukraine in 2022: 59 million tons of cargo or 54 % of exports from the country (Cargo handling in seaports of Ukraine decreased by 2.6 times in 2022 – USPA, 2023). General indicators show, against a background of martial law, that there was a substantial decrease in cargo turnover but not

a complete stop. In addition, in the ports of the Danube region (Izmail, Reni, Ust-Dunaïsk) there has been a significant increase compared to the pre-war period (Table 1):

Table 1. Cargo handling in Ukrainian ports (USPA, 2023)

Seaport	2021, million tones	2022, million tones	Difference, million tones
Pivdennyi	53.47	15.28	-38.19
Chornomorsk	25.63	11.76	-13.87
Odesa	22.56	7.69	-14.87
Izmail	4	8.89	+4.89
Reni	1.37	6.82	+5.45
Ust-Dunaïsk	0.06	0.78	+0.72

Amid the overall decrease of maritime cargo flows, the governance of coastal regions needs to focus on supporting the maritime cluster and creating favorable conditions for businesses to maintain operation under Ukrainian jurisdiction. Several studies suggest that maritime firms' locations (i.e., maritime law, P&I clubs, insurance brokers, classification societies, consultancy, surveyors, and maritime organizations) are mainly linked to the presence of a port industry and other maritime firms rather than to the mere presence of commodity flows (Akhavan et al., 2020). Therefore, it is essential for authorities to send a clear signal that plans for both the wartime and post-war development of ports and related infrastructure are on the table.

To that end, the Black Sea Grain Initiative ensured that not only are world hunger issues addressed and agricultural products from Ukraine exported timely but also enabled the three largest ports of Ukraine (Odesa, Pivdennyi, and Chornomorsk) to continue to work, contributing to the preservation of jobs and economic support for the state in difficult times. As of the beginning of February 2023, the total quantity of commodities shipped is 19.9 million tons, the main components of which were corn (47%) and wheat (29%) (Black Sea Grain Initiative Vessel Movements, n.d.; What has been shipped, n.d.). The start of the Grain Initiative in August 2022 ensured a gradual reorientation of the Danube ports to other previously uncharacteristic cargo types. For example, in February 2023, a new cargo flow of citrus fruits from Egypt came to the port of Reni for the first time. The unloading of vessels takes place using the "vessel-road transport" technology. Traditionally, citrus fruits were trans-shipped through the ports of Odesa (in 2019 – 40,400 tons; in 2020 – 26,500 tons; in 2021 – 14,300 tons; in 2022 – 7,600 tons) and Chornomorsk (in 2019 – 74,100 tons, in 2020 – 43,000 tons, in 2021 – 35,500 tons, in 2022 – 16,800 tons; Port Reny has attracted new cargo traffic, 2023). However, shippers had to find another method to deliver citrus fruits to consumers due to the restriction of said ports' operations to goods permitted within the Black Sea Grain Initiative. At the same time, in autumn–winter 2022–2023, the inhibition to the Black Sea Grain Initiative vessels caused by Russian inspections (Grain Initiative: the world loses millions of tons of Ukrainian foodstuffs every month due to actions of Russia, 2023; Lipchansky, 2023) significantly reduced the intensity of exports and became a bottleneck for all transport connections.

Problems with transport connections between large traders and ports were characteristic of the Ukrainian transport sector even prior to the war (Brznenko & Ptashuk, 2020; Transport collapse: a hundred grain trucks are waiting in line for unloading at the port of Odesa, 2015). These remain unresolved to this day, despite Ukraine's long-term leadership position in the world market of agricultural products. In addition, this actualizes the importance of the development and interaction of land and water transport connections in the coastal regions, defines the problem areas of their administration, and ensures their efficiency.

Solving these problems is possible under the joint efforts of stakeholders, including state and local authorities, grain traders, truckers, and grain terminals. Proposals for the unloading of transport communications include the following methods: 1) collecting grain in elevators along rivers and exporting by barges for trans-shipment to sea vessels – in this way, roads are saved, car traffic in cities decreases, the transport arm for vehicles decreases and, consequently, production costs decrease; 2) the use of rail transport; 3) the construction of bypass routes and roads to terminals and ports without using city streets; 4) the creation of accumulation areas at terminals to absorb the concentration of cars instead of along highways and city streets; 5) the formation of electronic queues (Todurov, 2022). For example, success has been had building an overpass and conveyor lines to transport grain over the “Pivdennyi – Odesa” highway (History of “Neptune”).

2. Coastal Regions’ Governance and Inland Connectivity

Maritime transport is the backbone of international trade and the global economy. Over 80 % of the volume of international trade in goods is carried by sea; this percentage is even higher for most developing countries (Launch of the Review of Maritime Transport, 2022). However, the maritime industry is vulnerable to disruptions of connectivity and supply chains caused by various crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic or ongoing Russo-Ukrainian armed conflict, to which the flexibility of the available capacities may be the most optimal response (Rožić et al., 2022). Furthermore, beginning from the Crimean occupation in 2014, the Ukrainian maritime industry and port infrastructure of coastal regions has experienced constant military threats, both hybrid and direct, which have led to annual decreases in cargo turnover (Kormych & Averochkina, 2022).

Coastal regions’ optics enable a broader examination of connectivity issues than mere maritime transport and port infrastructure. If land transport issues go beyond marine policies, then the inclusion of the river segment of waterways enables the formation of systems of feeder deliveries inland. These may contribute to both the coastal and inland regions of Ukraine. The development of connections between coastal regions and the main inland cities of Ukraine are critical given the lack of clarity over relations with Russia and Belarus, even after the armed conflict settlement. Hence, the east and north of Ukrainian land frontiers will likely be excluded from transport connections for a long period. Moreover, spatial structures and international trade are closely interrelated, and the size of coastal cities increases the greater the distance to their (inland) core region and the worse their transport conditions (Ducruet & Guerrero, 2022). However, feeder types of transportation do not have territorial universality and require the equipment of ports and terminals; together with the unfolding logistics networks and the seasonality of river transport, this complicates their stable functioning (Aleshinsky et al., 2015, p. 19). In addition, climate change poses a particular risk, leading to a decrease in the year’s water levels (Ivashko, 2021). For instance, during summer 2022, the drought caused the river shipping crisis and practically paralyzed the inland waterways in Europe (Wilkes et al., 2022).

In most of the seaports of Ukraine, sea and river vectors were historically combined. Therefore, the Ukrainian Maritime Doctrine draws attention to the importance of the development of inland water transport in general; the infrastructure of inland waterways, river ports, and terminals (section “National interests at sea”); the use of inland waterways, primarily the Dnipro, Danube rivers, Desna, and Southern Bug to expand the cargo and logistics base of maritime and mixed river-sea transportation (section “Threats to national security in the field of maritime activities”); the need to implement a comprehensive program for the development of shipping on rivers; and the need to increase volumes and reorientate outgoing cargo flows

to seaports from highways to river communications (chapter “Development of the maritime industry”), etc. At the same time, the draft Strategy for the Development of Inland Water Transport until 2031 and the plan of measures for its implementation have yet to be approved.

Nevertheless, the burden of drafting respective policies is not limited to central authorities as the need for marine planning processes at the regional or municipal level, rather than purely national, is now broadly recognized throughout European countries (Howells & Ramírez-Monsalve, 2022). This results in the idea of shifting governance over coastal areas by introducing a multilevel aspect by: 1) power devolution from central to local government; 2) increased international cooperation; 3) balancing power sharing between governments and civil society (Ministry of Environmental Protection and Regional Development of the Republic of Latvia, 2021). The core idea is that the power that a spatial plan has to take effect and be implemented cannot be separated from the mutual power relations between the organizations and actors that are its subject (Stojanovic & Gee, 2020).

Local authorities represent the next level of coastal regions’ governance. Ukrainian Maritime Doctrine formally emphasizes the role of local administrations as a tool for decentralizing the processes of organization and coordination of maritime complexes and ensuring the balanced development of coastal regions. Local authorities are better positioned to be aware of regional problems and needs. First, this concerns developing and equipping sea and river ports, related infrastructure, the training and promotion of personnel, the stimulation of scientific research, and reforming approaches to governance. However, the authority of local self-government bodies is mainly limited to coastal environmental issues (Law on Local Self-Government in Ukraine, Article 33; Water Code of Ukraine, Articles 6, 66, 67, 88; Law on Environmental Protection, Articles 6, 11, 35). This clearly indicates the necessity to expand the powers of local authorities over coastal governance. There is some progress at least – the stimulation and support of local initiatives regarding the effective use of the internal potential of regions are defined as one of the directions of state regional policy following Article 6 of the Law of Ukraine on the Basics of State Regional Policy.

However, local authorities of coastal regions typically possess limited capacity regarding human resources, governance instruments and economic options, which considerably affects their efficiency. The issue may be mitigated by the development of collaborative “bottom-up” governance models which feature broad stakeholder involvement (Lagzdina et al., 2017). The latter leads us to the third level of governance, which should be distinguished from the local one – the level of individual seaports. The expansion of opportunities for their modernization is possible only if the current system of distribution of profits of these state-owned enterprises is revised and the authority to administer port fees is returned, an authority which was canceled with the entry into force of the updated port legislation and the formation of the Ukrainian Sea Ports Authority (USPA). At the same time, the internal USPA aims of counteracting corruption and ensuring the targeted use of funds remain essential (USPA officials were exposed for misappropriation of funds: they embezzled 90 million during the deepening of the seabed in the port of Odesa region, 2023; Nikitin & Popadiuk, 2015). There has been considerable discussion about the main stakeholders role in managing coastal regions at the individual port level. Even though public stakeholders play a major role, the entrepreneurial sphere and intermediate bodies (associations and unions) also shape the territorial and port governance. Ship-owners play a rather solitary role; nevertheless, they exert significant influence (Loubet & Serry, 2022).

An example of a new infrastructural regional project that has already been implemented is the restoration at the end of August 2022 of the railway connection between Odessa and the Danube ports through the territory of Moldova (Ukrzaliznytsia restored the section that

connected Ukraine and Moldova in Odesa region, 2022). Unfortunately, the implementation of this initiative occurred under the influence of war risks, the damage to the railway bridge across the Dniester estuary (Poletti, 2022), and the limited functioning of seaports (Devitt et al., 2022). At the same time, the search for new cooperation mechanisms must be constantly carried out, especially in the coastal and border regions, which also have access to the river inland and international trade routes.

The “Danube” direction of the development of inland water transport and its infrastructure should be singled out due to the inclusion of the inland waterways of Ukraine to TEN-T. Furthermore, it is the Danube region that currently most demonstrates the tendency to create logistics hubs (grain direction). Indeed, their formation has already begun – LLC “SP Nibulon” in October 2022 completed the first construction stage of a new grain terminal in Izmail, Odesa region. As this direction received the most active implementation in 2022 and will be further updated and developed through the renovation of the Danube ports and accompanying infrastructure (An impetus for the development of the Danube region has been received – Volodymyr Kozakevych, 2022; Moskalenko, 2022), it should therefore be especially noted in policy documents. The most recent (October 2021) program document of the maritime industry, the Marine Environmental Protection Strategy of Ukraine, notes that its implementation will contribute to the balanced development of coastal regions and create positive trends in the socioeconomic and ecological development of southern Ukraine. The latter document is derived from Ukrainian obligations under the Association Agreement with the EU and Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy. However, it is aimed at the ecological aspects of the development of coastal regions.

3. Coastal Regions, Integrated Management, and Maritime Regionalism

The integrated approach has become the standard for the administration of activities in the coastal regions of many countries. In Europe, this was facilitated by the Model Law on the Sustainable Management of Coastal Zones and the European Code of Conduct for Coastal Zones (1999). In the USA, coastal zone management programs were launched in the late 1960s. At the global level, this approach was also supported at The World Coast Conference (Netherlands, 1993). As noted by Eger et al. (2021), integrated coastal management offers an alternative to the sectoral management of coastal and marine social-ecological systems and is typically characterized in the literature by the following features:

- effective inclusion of diverse actor groups and knowledge types;
- formal structures;
- innovative mechanisms (e.g., structures or arrangements);
- horizontal linkages;
- iterative, reflective or reflexive;
- multiple, balanced objectives;
- connection to local context.

The Ukrainian Maritime Doctrine provides for the development of integrated coastal management, emphasizing that implementing an integrated approach to managing maritime activities in coastal regions is essential to their sustainable development. To some extent, integrated management is also addressed in the State Regional Development Strategy for 2021–2027 in the section “Tasks in the direction of Implementation of maritime potential for the development of coastal regions and reproduction of the natural environment of the Azov and Black Seas.” The Marine Environmental Protection Strategy recognizes the absence of the integrated management of natural resources of the Azov and Black Seas (section “Analysis

of the current state of affairs, trends and justification for the need to solve the identified problems”) and the need for its creation by 2024. The Draft Law on the Coastal Strip of the Seas defines the integrated management of the coastal strip of the seas as the balanced and comprehensive management of environmental usage within the coastal strip of the seas, considering ecological, economic, and social interests aimed at preserving its ecosystems and landscapes for present and future generations (Article 2). It is also proposed that the integrated management of the coastal strip be understood as the development of the coastal strip and its management in combination with ecological goals and elements of mutual influence (Report on research work scientific and methodological support for the creation and development of networks of protected marine water areas and coastal territories, 2019, p. 52).

At the same time, in many cases, the question arises of how truly integrated is such integrated management. For example, the Integrated Coastal Management Initiative has been created as a measure of adaptation to climate change (Integrated Coastal Management as an adaptation to climate change measure, n.d.), i.e., its main purpose is nature protection. To this end, the Integrated Coastal Management Act (2008) of South Africa is a notable exception, providing for the coordinated and integrated management of the coastal zone by all spheres of government following the principles of cooperative management, and establishing the National Coastal Committee as well as defining its functions. The creation of such a state structure corresponds to SDG 14. Furthermore, it helps to solve the problem which occurs when strategies and policies for biodiversity and the environment, fisheries, and climate change are developed and implemented by diverse agencies (Vierros, 2017). In Ukraine, at the end of 2022, there was a merger of the two ministries – the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Ministry of Development of Communities and Territories – most heavily involved in the administration of coastal regions. At the beginning of December, the relevant decision was adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (Izvoschikova, 2022), and the new Ministry of Development of Communities, Territories, and Infrastructure was created. The Regulation of the new Ministry (Resolution on some issues of activity of central executive bodies, 2022) gives it authority to determine the order of formation of the concept of integrated development of the territory of the territorial community (item 41, item 4).

It should be noted that integrated management is close to the ideas of maritime regionalism as a vector of international cooperation. The basis of such cooperation is a specific water area’s geographical (regional) peculiarity. According to Adewumi (2021), regionalism in maritime governance comprises the institutionalization and coordination of efforts geared at common coastal and marine challenges, with cumulative effects that involve different actors via binding or non-binding rules, regulations, actions, strategies, and policies enforced by regionally mandated organizations. MARPOL 73/78, according to which the Black Sea is defined as a “special area,” is an example of the manifestation of maritime regionalism in the aspect of international legal regulation of a specific type of maritime activity in a particular area of marine space (universal international legal regulation of a global nature). The regional approach is the basis of the Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution (1992) and other regional agreements in the field of marine environment protection. It was also actively used in UNCLOS’82, specifically in the regulations on the cooperation of states located on the coast of enclosed and semi-enclosed seas (part IX. Enclosed or semi-enclosed seas), as well as in the regional system of Port State Control. However, within the framework of traditional maritime regionalism, the land component, and the connection with other elements (inland waterways and other types of transport, border cooperation) are merely considered. Instead, it is mainly aimed at building a supranational, regional mechanism to administrate the regimes of the relevant water areas; the adjacent land areas

act as auxiliaries. A comprehensive approach to such areas is reflected in the concept of the integrated management of coastal (or seaside) zones (regions), based on Agenda 21 (Chapter 17 "Protection of the oceans, all kinds of seas, including enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, and coastal areas and the protection, rational use and development of their living resources"). This approach is still largely lacking program documents on the development of maritime activities in the coastal regions of Ukraine.

Conclusions

The experience of almost a year of work under the conditions of the Russian invasion shows the growing importance of the integrated management of coastal zones in mitigating the risks and consequences of war and ensuring post-war sustainable development. Coastal regions should be considered leaders in creating jobs, ensuring connectivity, and infrastructure development. Building the effective governance of coastal regions in Ukraine requires the following steps: 1) making changes to program documents and current legislation that strengthen the regional approach and consider land–sea interactions; 2) focusing on a combination of sea and inland water transport beyond mere environmental protection measures; 3) simultaneous planning for during the war and post-war development; 4) an emphasis on municipal and local participation in planning, with broad stakeholder involvement; 5) consideration when introducing integrated management in coastal regions; 6) the implementation of EU best governance practices.

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Кузнєцов С., Владишевська В., Кузнєцов С. Приморські регіони України: трансформація управління в умовах російського вторгнення. – Стаття.

Поточна ситуація у приморських регіонах України підкреслює необхідність взаємодії між різними видами транспорту для задоволення попиту на експортно-імпортні операції. Це є особливо актуальним через ризики російсько-українського збройного конфлікту та перспектив майбутньої відбудови України. Поточні програмні документи довгостроко-

вого планування у морській сфері вимагають більшої орієнтації на інтереси та потреби приморських регіонів. Мають бути передбачені спеціальні норми про синергію морського та внутрішнього водного транспорту, а також різних видів наземного транспорту у приморських регіонах. Формування комплексного підходу до розвитку приморських регіонів потребує узгодження різноманітних програмних документів. Досвід роботи морського та внутрішнього водного транспорту у воєнний час, зміщення судноплавства з морських портів до портів, що поєднують морські та річкові сполучення упродовж п'яти місяців 2022 року, та відновлення регіонального транспортного співробітництва свідчать про формування нового комплексного підходу до прибережних регіонів; такого, що вимагає оновленого регулювання та довгострокового стратегічного планування.

Ключові слова: морська діяльність, морський транспорт, внутрішній водний транспорт, річковий транспорт, регіональне співробітництво, програмні документи, російська агресія.

